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ABSTRACT
Here, we analyze the construction and politicization of the environmental problems created by the
urban wastewater overflows in the area of the Vantaa River, Finland, between 2004 and 2015. The
contradictory uses and values of the river as a wastewater channel and important recreational haven
with widely acclaimed ecological values forms the context of this case study. We investigate what
types of environmental problem are caused by urban wastewater overflows, how the various
stakeholders define the problem, and possible solutions to it. The analysis is based on written
materials produced by individuals associated with the problem, applying the method of content
analysis. We identify various stages in the evolution of the problem and suggest ways in which
cooperation between stakeholders can be enhanced to minimize environmental damage and social
harm. These include formulating a common goal, improved mutual information sharing, realistic and
clearly communicated plans for technological improvements, and a common understanding of the
timescales used for the anticipated results.
Keywords │ Case study; Construction of environmental problems; Cooperation; Finland;
Politicization; Vantaa River; Wastewater overflows
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2HSY = Helsinki Region Environmental Services Authority
HU = Helsingin Uutiset (newspaper)
MP = Member of Parliament
NGO = Non-governmental organization
SSO = Sanitary system overflow
VHVSY = Water Protection Association of the Vantaa River and Helsinki Region
Virho = Association for Stream Care (Environmental NGO)
VS = Vantaan Sanomat (newspaper)
WWTP = Wastewater treatment plant
Yle News = Finland’s national broadcasting company
INTRODUCTION
Here, we examine the construction and politicization of wastewater overflows as an environmental
problem. Wastewater overflows are unpredictable and stochastic incidents that challenge our
perceptions of reliable and extensive basic infrastructures, such as sewerage and wastewater
treatment. Along with the maturing wastewater infrastructure during the last century, sanitary services
have become a normalized and standardized background process that operates unnoticed, is largely
invisible, socially ignored, and taken for granted, unless confronted with a breakdown and functional
flaw (Bowker & Star, 1998; Graham & Marvin, 2001). Wastewater overflows are such cases of
exceptions in the functioning of the wastewater infrastructure.
An overflow occurs when non-purified wastewater either accidentally exits or is
intentionally eliminated from the wastewater treatment system and led unpurified into the receiving
body of water. Combined sewer overflows (CSOs) are usually caused by sudden flows of excessive
water into the wastewater treatment system that exceed the capacity of the system (Metcalf & Eddy
Inc., 2003). This occurs mainly due to heavy rains and melting snow (Tibbetts, 2005). Sanitary system
overflows (SSOs) can be caused by entrance of stormwater or technical defects, such as blockages,
disruptions in pumping operations, or structural and mechanical failures (Metcalf & Eddy Inc., 2003).
Both CSOs and SSOs cause harmful effects in the environment.1
The aim of intentionally performed overflows is to prevent uncontrolled flooding,
especially in urban areas (e.g. Tibbetts, 2005). However, extensive improvements in wastewater
treatment systems during recent decades have resulted in the acknowledgement that wastewater
overflows are considerable sources of pollution in receiving water systems (Lau et al., 2002; Metcalf
& Eddy Inc., 2003). Overflow problems are internationally significant, since similar drainage systems
across the developed world face severe challenges, due to increasing urbanization, under-designed
wastewater treatment systems, and climate change, which is expected to increase and intensify
1 In this study, we don’t differentiate between CSOs and SSOs, even though their environmental impacts vary
considerably, due to different dilutive circumstances.
3rainfall (Semadeni-Davies et al., 2007; Nie et al., 2009; Heinonen et al., 2013). The future overflow
problem is likely to be more significant. Within the European context, societal pressure to enhance
water protection is high, and since 2000, the European Union (EU) Water Framework Directive has
obliged member states to achieve “good ecological status” of surface waters, including rivers.
Wastewater overflows are subject to intensive technical, engineering, and water-quality research.
However, we are not aware of previous studies focusing on the overflows as a socially constructed
and politicized environmental problem.
Both the risk of unintentional overflows due to technical flaws and the option for
intentional and controlled wastewater overflows due to the capacity limits of systems have been
designed and purposefully built into wastewater treatment systems (e.g. Tibbetts, 2005). Overflows
occur and have always occurred as unforeseen and irregular, but not surprising, events. However, the
overflows that have for decades occurred without public attention and criticism, rather unnoticed and
as “business-as-usual” (BAU) procedures, have now become the targets of heavy public criticism and
a seemingly unaccepted convention. This has led to tensions between the various stakeholders, such
as representatives of wastewater treatment services and recreational users.
Here, we investigate how the normalized, but occasional, occurrence of wastewater
overflows became a contested and politicized environmental problem and how the tension between
stakeholders could be reduced. Our underlying premise in the study is that wastewater overflows
cannot be considered as straightforward technical problems to be solved by mere engineering
operations. The prevention of wastewater overflows can never succeed completely, which makes it
imperative to investigate the societal frames and processes in which overflows are constructed as
harmful environmental problems. Hence, constructive suggestions can also be made about how to
improve overflow management and alleviate the politicized struggle among the various stakeholders.
The research is based on a case study of a waterbody located in southern Finland, the
Vantaa River. It covers the time period 2004–2015. By examination of the different ways the various
stakeholders define and interpret the problem, we seek to increase the understanding of the process
of constructing and politicizing. We also analyze how disputes over environmental problems related
to wastewater overflows could be reduced or solved, based on experience from the Vantaa River case.
The article proceeds with an introduction of the analytical framework of our analysis, followed by a
description of our case site, and eventually the materials and methods. Later, we present five key
findings of our study and discuss them together with some practical recommendations.
Politicization of environmental problems
Following the contextual constructivist approach to environmental problems, we acknowledge the
actual changes that have occurred in the physical environment, but simultaneously base our inquiry
on the viewpoint that these changes in the physical environment are constructed as environmental
problems through societal negotiation and interpretation (Jones, 2002; Hannigan, 2006). Even if some
change in the environment is constructed as a problem, it is not necessarily politicized. A topic is
politicized when it evokes claims and becomes an object of public debate (e.g. Hannigan, 2006;
Häikiö & Leino, 2014). There are also other ways to define politicization, but here it is defined simply
as the act of opening, broadening, and restoring public discussion (Pellizzoni, 2011). In a model
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process: assembling, presenting, and contesting environmental claims. We have applied this model
as an analytical framework in our case study (e.g. Ragin, 1994).
Scientific evidence is of crucial importance in constructing environmental problems
(e.g. Hannigan, 2006; Pellizzoni, 2011). It forms the basis of the assembly phase (Hannigan, 2006).
Nevertheless, as Yearley (2002) pointed out, the problems that seem to be most important by
scientific evidence are not always those that gain the most attention. This suggests that there are also
mechanisms other than the actual state of the environment that affect the rise of environmental
concern.
 Public discussion occurs mainly in the mass media, which gives it a significant role in
the construction and politicization of environmental issues (e.g. Laine & Peltonen, 2003; Gavin,
2009), especially in the claim presenting phase (Hannigan, 2006). Opinion trends in society can be
initiated in or through the media, although they find final political representation only through and in
political organizations (Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999). It is important to remember that the target of the
media is not to protect the environment, but to sell the news (e.g. Yearley, 2002). This means that the
media does not report on environmental issues of little general interest.
If society is convinced that a problem exists and it needs a solution, there will be a
contest about how the problem should be solved. At this phase, it is important to develop technical
expertise and create functioning networks between the parties related to the problem. It is also
important to find ways to open new policy windows. Cooptation, issue fatigue, and countervailing
claims  can  still  rule  out  solving  of  the  problem.  The  process  is  not  necessarily  linear  and  can  be
interrupted at any phase (Hannigan, 2006). During the study period, our case was mainly in the phases
of claims presenting and contesting, as will be seen.
Empirical context of Vantaa River, southern Finland
Our study was performed in the empirical context of the Vantaa River, a roughly 100-km-long river
in  southern  Finland  (see  Fig.  1).  It  drains  into  the  Baltic  Sea  at  Vanhankaupunginlahti  Bay,
approximately 6 km northeast of the city center of Helsinki. The source of the river is in Lake
Lallujärvi in the municipality of Hausjärvi.
The average flow of the Vantaa River is a modest 16 m3/s, but the scarcity of lakes (only
2% of the basin) in the region increases fluctuations in the river flow. During spring floods, it peaks
at 300 m3/s, but may drop to a mere 2 m3/s during the summer months. The river’s watershed (1686
km2) encompasses, at least partly, the jurisdiction of 14 municipalities with a total of more than one
million people. This is roughly 20% of the entire population of Finland. The Vantaa River is located
in the most densely populated parts of the country. The southern part of the catchment is especially
urbanized, but apart from communal centers, agricultural lands and forests predominate in the
northern parts of the catchment.
5Figure 1. Vantaa River (dark color), its tributaries, and the watershed. Numbered bullets denote the
watersheds’ wastewater treatment plants (WWTPs), i.e. the main sources for overflows into the river.
Purified wastewaters from the Helsinki central treatment plant are discharged into the Gulf of Finland.
Since the late 19th century, the water quality of the Vantaa River has been degraded,
especially during the 1960s and 1970s, when municipal and industrial wastewaters polluted it heavily
and improvements in wastewater treatment were not yet effective (Schönach, 2015). Since the 1980s,
continual progress has been made in decreasing wastewater loading into the Vantaa River, both in
terms of quantity and quality. Communal sanitation infrastructural coverage has been extended,
existing treatment facilities have been upgraded and, most importantly, an extensive pumping
network was finalized in 1987 in the northeastern parts of the catchment. During the study period,
the number of wastewater treatment plants (WWTPs) discharging into the Vantaa River has decreased
from eight to five because wastewaters have been conveyed to the central WWTP in Helsinki for
treatment. These treated wastewaters are discharged into the Gulf of Finland, hence decreasing
pressure on the river. However, several WWTPs serving the municipalities in the northern parts of
the  catchment  still  drain  the  purified  wastewaters  into  the  river  (see  Fig.  1).  Our  study  covers  the
years 2004–2014 and the first 6 months of 2015.
6Currently, the river water quality is moderate according to classification defined in the
EU Water Framework Directive (Vahtera et al., 2014). To meet the extended aims of the EU Water
Framework Directive, including a good ecological status by 2015 and subsequently by 2021,
considerable improvements are still required in the Vantaa River (Vahtera et al., 2010). The Vantaa
River also serves as the secondary and emergency freshwater source for the Helsinki region, Lake
Päijänne in Central Finland being the main source. Due to this function, the water quality of the river
is of critical importance under exceptional conditions (e.g. in 2008, see Results and Discussion).
The waterway system of the Vantaa River is an important recreational area. It has
widely acclaimed ecological and cultural/historical value, and several parts of it have been declared
nature protection areas, including 17 areas that form part of the Pan-European Natura 2000 network.
Improvement in the previously degraded water quality has increased its recreational value and
revitalized fishing opportunities. The first fish ladder was built at the river mouth in 1986, and since
1996 restoration efforts, especially for improved migrant fish reproduction, have been carried out at
a cost of more than 1 million euros. In 2012, a total of 6621 fishing licenses were granted for the area
(Haikonen et al., 2013; www.vantaanjoki.com). Since the river is important for a highly populated
region, its water quality is in the interest of various stakeholders.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
To investigate our research questions, we applied the case study as our research strategy. It aims at
detailed, intensive knowledge about a single case that illuminated the phenomenon under scrutiny
and was investigated within its real-life context (Yin, 2003). Case-study research is typically based
on several types of material.
To trace back the process of environmental problem construction, we collected
documentary material produced by the stakeholders of the case and comprehensive media material.
The documentary material included reports, bulletins, statements, and inquiries on the subject in the
Parliament of Finland (Eduskunta). We analyzed annually published statutory environmental
monitoring reports, independent studies commissioned by stakeholders, and research conducted by
national research institutes. The most important stakeholders include the environmental non-
governmental organization (NGO) Association for Stream Care (Virtavesien hoitoyhdistys, Virho),
which focuses especially on fishery issues and the Water Protection Association of the Vantaa River
and  Helsinki  Region  (Vantaanjoen ja Helsingin seudun vesiensuojeluyhdistys, VHVSY), a broad
based association with members representing municipal and commercial interests, and various non-
profit  NGOs.  We  also  analyzed  reports  by  various  consulting  firms  and  the  Helsinki  Region
Environmental Services Authority (Helsingin Seudun ympäristöpalvelut, HSY), responsible for water
and waste-management services and regional and environmental information services. The Members
of Parliament (MPs) drew up three written questions and one proposal for action. These were also
included in the analyses.
The other major source consisted of media material from the main newspaper of
Finland, Helsingin Sanomat (HS), and from the national broadcasting company’s (Yle News) news
service, including public commentaries on the respective articles. Articles were also collected from
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the overflow question more than briefly, numbering 69 in total, were included in the material.
The analysis was initiated with a chronological and detailed description of the case and
the evolution of public debate on the wastewater overflows. Based on this material, we created a
chronological description of the conversation. This was done by organizing the material in a table.
We marked who had published the material and when, what the main information was on the overflow
problem, and whose point of view was presented. Thereafter, we analyzed the material more
thoroughly, using qualitative content analysis (e.g. Krippendorff & Bock, 2009) and within the
analytical framework of the construction process of the environmental problems. We focused
especially on the various stakeholders’ standpoints and how they evolved during the study period.
We reflected the evolution of the debate on the model of Hannigan (2006).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The temporal starting point of our research was the year 2004. During the summer of that year,
exceptionally large wastewater overflows were reported in association with summer floods. Extensive
fish die-offs occurred in the river and there was debate over who was responsible. In 2008, the Vantaa
River and its water quality were the objects of increased public scrutiny. Due to some renovation
work in the primary water-supply aqueduct, for 9 months the river served as the freshwater source
for  the  entire  Helsinki  region.  In  terms  of  overflows,  the  next  critical  year  was  2010,  when again
exceptionally large overflows occurred. The overflow debate was brought out at the national level
and also discussed in Parliament, while polarized debate over the discharges was led in public.
Media coverage of the overflow episodes during the study period varied strongly. As
presented in Figure 2, the media focus tended to follow the amount of emissions, but it did not follow
them directly. In some years, the news coverage decreased, although the emissions increased. This
may have resulted from the discharges not being large enough to provoke public outrage; this was
probably the case during 2006 and 2007. The emissions may also have lost their news value very
rapidly, which was probably the case in 2011. This reflects on Yearley (2002), who pointed out that
the media wants stories that sell easily in the media market, and continuing bad practice does not sell.
If it is not possible to find a new point of view, the topic loses its novelty, which has been identified
as  one  of  the  key  pitfalls  in  the  claims  presenting  phase  of  environmental  problem  construction
(Hannigan, 2006). This suggests that news coverage may follow more the change in emission
amounts rather than the absolute amount of emissions.
8Figure 2. Wastewater overflows to the Vantaa River and the number of news articles reporting the
overflow incidents during 2004–2014.
Based on activity in producing materials and appearance in the media data, the key stakeholders of
the case were the municipal waterworks and their representatives, community and state officials, and
NGOs. Some individual politicians and private persons were also active in the debates. The officials
played a major role, which is in line with previous studies concerning public discussion on
environmental problems in Finland (Väliverronen, 1997). The stakeholders were divided into two
groups: NGOs, some communal officials, some politicians, and private persons strongly criticizing
the overflows (the critical group) and some officials, some politicians, and representatives of WWTPs
contesting the criticism (the BAU group). The most active stakeholders remained the same during the
study period.
We determined that effects of the overflows most discussed were the possible injuries
caused to fish and to the recreational use of the river. The debate over effects of the overflows mainly
reflected the claims presenting phase in the model of Hannigan (2006), but there were also issues
related to the assembly phase. Other important themes included technology, money, and workings of
the wastewater treatment organizations and officials. The debate over these themes reflected more
the  contesting  phase  of  Hannigan’s  model.  Towards  the  end  of  the  study  period,  a  settling  of  the
debate was observed, although no clear solution was found to the overflow problem.
Scientific controversy weakens the basis of the problem
The main ecological problems caused by wastewater overflows are eutrophication and hypoxia. Our
materials showed that hypoxia is considered more significant in the Vantaa River, because
9eutrophication is largely caused by scattered loading (non-point source pollution) (e.g. Vahtera et al.,
2014). Nevertheless, the relationship between cause and effect is not always clear. This leads to a
situation in which the scientific basis of the claim against overflows is controversial.
Usually,  hypoxia  affects  the  river  only  for  limited  durations;  however,  it  can  still  be
lethal for organisms or disturb reproduction. In the Vantaa River, the possibilities of fish mortality
and problems in spawning have become the objects of increased focus, because there are numerous
active fishermen in the region. Both Virho and officials have worked hard to better the living
conditions of fish in the river.
Fish mortality was one of the main news topics in the first study year in 2004. After the
summer floods, the fish stocks in the river collapsed. At first, the wastewater overflows were blamed
(Yle News 12.8.2004; HS 13.8.2004). The regional fisheries authority demanded that cities should
compensate them for the resources they had used to restore the fish stocks (HS 14.8.2004a; Yle News
14.8.2004), but the cities refuted their responsibility, arguing that there was no way to prevent the
overflows (HS 14.8.2004b). The regional environment centers also argued that the real reason for the
oxygen depletion was the scattered loading, which also increased during the floods. (HS 20.8.2004;
Vahtera et al., 2005). No compensation was paid, and consensus about the reason for the hypoxia
was not reached. Officially, it was announced that both overflows and scattered loading caused the
hypoxia (Uusimaa Employment and Economic Development Center & VHVSY, 2004; Saura et al.,
2005). However, VHVSY emphasized the scattered loading (Vahtera et al., 2005), while Virho stuck
with the argument that the main reason was the overflows, but that their influence was underestimated
on purpose by the officials (Stenholm, 2004; Stenholm & Lehtinen, 2005). This resulted in
communicative tension between the parties that was still discernible after 10 years (HS 1.6.2014).
Fish mortality was mentioned in the media data every year between 2008 and 2012.
Still, there was no fish mortality case in which it could be proved that the main reason was wastewater
overflows. In July 2010, there was a case in which all the fish from a certain part of the river near the
Riihimäki WWTP died, but contrasting views about the reasons prevailed (Yle News 12.7.2010; HS
20.7.2010). The critical group insisted on the view that the fish die-offs caused by the wastewater
were one of the worst problems of the river (e.g. Stenholm & Lehtinen, 2005; Stenholm, 2006, 2012).
One official from the regional environmental center even said that the oxygen depletions and fish die-
offs were continuous, due to the regular overflows (Yle News 3.10.2009). However, in the reports
produced by VHVSY and the Finnish Game and Fisheries Research Institute, the fish die-offs did not
appear continuously. This shows that there was contradictory information even among the officials.
Research reports of the impacts of the wastewater on organisms are contradictory. In
some reports, the impact was evaluated as significant (Haikonen et al., 2010), while others tended to
consider it of minor significance (Raunio et al., 2009, 2011). On the other hand, the quality of the
reports  and  the  methods  for  investigating  the  impacts  were  criticized,  both  by  the  NGOs  and  the
officials themselves (Stenholm, 2008; Raunio et al., 2009, 2011; Haikonen et al., 2013). This suggests
that improving scientific monitoring is needed for better understanding of the ecological importance
of overflows.
The contradictions presented in this chapter weaken the scientific basis of the problem.
This  is  a  typical  pitfall  in  the  assembly  phase  of  the  construction  of  environmental  problems
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(Hannigan, 2006). The lack of proper scientific bases makes it difficult for the public and other
stakeholders to construct a view of the severity of the overflow problem. Since there is no shared
consensus of the effects caused by overflows, it is difficult to reach a consensus of the responsibilities
and rights of the various stakeholders.
Overflows encumber the recreational use of the river
The problems affecting humans are important justifications for the claims of the critical group. The
wastewater overflows decrease the hygienic quality of the river. The low hygienic quality prevents
recreational uses of the river, especially swimming, but also canoeing and fishing. The importance of
the river as a swimming place stands out, because there are not many lakes in the region. The low
hygienic quality also prevents the use of the river water for watering vegetable gardens.
Visible pollution makes it unpleasant to spend time on the riverbanks and visit nature
trails. The wastewater overflows harm the image people have of the river. This may cause people to
see pollution even when it does not exist; e.g. they may interpret the natural brownish color of the
river as a sign of pollution, as was noted in inquiries made to fishermen (e.g. Saura et al., 2005).
Every time overflows occurred during the summer, they triggered questioning of the
safety of the river water to swimmers. Officials warned about the insufficient hygienic quality and
the related health risks for swimmers during three different summer overflow episodes (HS 3.8.2004,
4.8.2004, 6.8.2004, 14.8.2010; Yle News 13.8.2010, 23.8.2010, 1.6.2011). In 2004, additional water-
quality monitoring by environmental officials was introduced, out of concern for swimmers (HS
11.8.2004). Two swimmers were also interviewed in the media. Their reactions reflected the
continual nature of environmental change and the multidimensional and temporally shifting
perception of these changes by the public. One interviewee was not worried, because in any case the
condition of the river was better than before (HS 13.8.2010); the other was worried that her old
swimming place would be unusable (Yle News 16.8.2010). Comparison of past recreational
possibilities and anticipations of future conditions mark very different approaches to prevailing
conditions.
Officials also interpreted the risks related to water quality after overflow episodes
differently, and hence contrasting recommendations became public. In the summer of 2010, the
VHVSY announced that swimming should be avoided, while the City of Helsinki Environment
Centre declared that there was no special risk (Yle News 13.8.2010; HS 14.8.2010). The VHVSY
showed that the contradictions were due to varying observation techniques and sampling sites (HS
14.8.2010). This example highlights that “good water quality for swimming” is somewhat arbitrary,
despite the use of official monitoring standards and scientific follow-up.
The efficiency of communication about the overflows was also inadequate. Despite
continual observation of the quality of the water, a lifeguard at a riverine swimming place claimed
that she received no official information about the overflows (HS 13.8.2010). Similarly, Virho
claimed that since nobody else cared to inform fishermen about the water quality, Virho should obtain
the information about overflows more rapidly (HU 25.7.2013; Stenholm, 2013). Communication
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problems about overflows and related water-quality risks concerned accuracy, timing, extent, and
efficiency.
The process shows that scientific proof alone is not sufficient to tackle the problem. In
the  case  of  the  Vantaa  River,  a  scientific  consensus  exists  that  most  of  the  emissions  are  not  a
significant threat to human health. Likewise, agricultural emissions pose an overall greater
environmental burden to the river than the wastewater overflows. Despite acknowledging this, the
critique against the overflows has been strong. Although the discharges into the Vantaa River have
recently been much smaller than previously, they have sparked more intense activism and heated
debate. The boundaries of acceptability have shifted, with new emphases on environmental values
and increasing welfare. Wastewater overflows are not considered acceptable in a society with living
standards as high as in Finland. The growing environmental and health-related concerns have also
challenged current methods of wastewater treatment in use elsewhere, and it is likely that future
pressure will increase (Metcalf & Eddy Inc., 2003). The mental image of the overflows is already bad
enough to harm the recreational values of the river and to make people consider them as a problem.
The swimming bans and other signs of overflows reinforce the mental image and decrease the
recreational values concretely.
Accusations of technological and financial limits
The BAU group claims that the grounds for the emergence of an overflow conflict is change in the
ways of thinking. According to them, it was previously generally accepted that it is occasionally
necessary to release wastewater into rivers and seas, but now public opinion has changed (Urho,
2011; HS 28.4.2013). On the other hand, the awareness of the public about the built-in possibility for
deliberate overflows can be questioned. According to the critical group, people have been shocked
when learning that overflows are an existing and legal practice (e.g. VS 23.9.2011). If people have
never, in effect, understood that the WWTPs – even renovated ones – permit the overflows, they have
never consciously accepted it in the first place. It seems, the process is influenced by two overlapping
developments: the combination of increasing general awareness and less tolerant opinion of those
who are aware of the overflows.
Technological issues were at the core of the argumentation of the BAU group that the
unavoidability of overflows should be rationalized. The main problems are the wide variation in
influent flow volumes, the outdated or aging technology, the insufficient capacity of the WWTPs to
deal with these fluctuations, the combined sewers, and the fact that it is difficult to build sewers that
will never leak (e.g. Yle News 11.9.2010, 11.4.2011, 13.11.2012, HS 30.4.2011; Urho, 2011).
Representatives  of  the  WWTPs  stated  that  it  is  not  possible  to  build  sewer  systems  adjusted  for
flooding periods, because then the systems would not function under normal conditions (e.g. HS
14.8.2004b). A balance between exceptional situations and normal operation is always a compromise.
The technological framework of the problem is highlighted in the statement that the
fundamental problem is a sanitation system based on water. Hence, the real solution of the overflow
question would need an entirely different infrastructure to be built (HS 1.5.2013). This statement
remained singular and exemplifies how preset frameworks of public debate rule out some
perspectives as irrational or irrelevant (Mikola & Häikiö, 2014). The “non-decision making” (cf.
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Jakku et al., 2009) on these ruled-out perspectives are, in this case, excluded through infrastructural
path dependency. The solutions to the problem must be in alignment with the currently accepted
technological frameworks, while too large a scale of modifications is excluded from the range of
possible solutions.
The wastewater treatment infrastructure is one of the most costly construction systems
supporting general welfare. Hence, the economic question is always strongly present in the debates.
The main argument of the BAU group was that prevention of all overflows is too costly in comparison
to the benefits achievable (Eduskunta, 2010b; Yle News 11.4.2011; VS 15.11.2012). It was also
suggested that some of the money that should go to the renovation of sewers and WWTPs ends up
being used for other purposes, since the communities nearly always have more need for investment
than resources to invest (VS 23.9.2011). HSY especially highlighted that they could not do the
renovations required if the funding was not secured (Urho, 2011). Communities are constantly
confronted with prioritization issues, and the urgency of improvements in wastewater treatment is
compared with other needs.
The acting Minister of the Environment demanded that the cities in the Vantaa River
watershed should invest more in wastewater treatment (Eduskunta, 2010a, b, c, 2011), but she also
admitted the current financial situation is difficult (Yle News 16.8.2010). Her response to a written
question at Parliament about the overflow problem stated that it is not possible to stop overflows
“without unreasonable costs” (Eduskunta, 2010b). The cities in the upper reaches of the river have
historically considered investments in wastewater treatment infrastructure as unproductive, since the
main benefits are experienced at the lower reaches (Schönach, 2015). This was also seen in our case,
when it was proposed that the negative effects of overflows could be reduced with the extra water
from Lake Päijänne. The upper-reach cities rejected the idea as too costly (Yle News 27.8.2010). On
the other hand, Helsinki argued that it is unfair that its citizens should bear the brunt of the pollution
from the upper-reach cities (Yle News 27.6.2012). The geographic disconnection of the original
location of the discharges at the upper-reach WWTPs and the negative environmental consequences
downstream complicate the debate about costs, benefits, and responsibilities.
No overall solutions to the technical and financial problems were presented.
Nevertheless, the WWTPs are seeking such solutions (HSY, 2014). One effort was the expansion and
renewal of the Riihimäki WWTP, which has been most often the source of large emissions. The
reconstructed and extended plant began operations in early 2015, and expectant outlooks were
expressed over the termination of overflows from Riihimäki during normal spring weather (HS
16.2.2015). However, in the same news article, the representative from the Riihimäki WWTP said
that no facility could handle the extraordinary amount of water received in the summer of 2004.
By the end of the study period, the technical questions remained partly unresolved.
Some technical improvements have been carried out and others are planned, but there is still no
solution that could end the overflows totally. It remains open whether the various stakeholders can
find a shared point of view when it  comes to the financial  side of the issue.  At the same time, the
stakeholders do not totally agree that the technological and financial problems are the most important
reasons behind the overflow problem, as will be shown in the next chapter.
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Accusations of lack of will, cooperation, and open communication
A crucial factor contributing to the politicization of the overflow problem is the mutual distrust of
stakeholders and accusations of insufficient communication. The critical group stated that those in
charge of the wastewater treatment care nothing for the ecological and recreational values of the
Vantaa River (e.g. Stenholm & Lehtinen, 2005; Yle News 12.7.2010, 27.8.2010; HS 14.10.2012).
Their argument was that the problem could be solved if there was only the will to do so.
The critical group also saw that there was a lack of cooperation and open
communication (e.g. Stenholm, 2004, 2013; Stenholm & Lehtinen, 2005; HS 16.10.2008; Vahtera et
al., 2008). Virho even accused the officials of giving false information and systematically covering
up the wastewater overflows (Stenholm, 2004, 2008, 2012; Stenholm & Lehtinen, 2005). Officials
declined to respond to the accusation directly, but later the representatives of the WWTPs did
highlight that they were willing to cooperate and to improve communication (e.g. HS 20.11.2011).
They argued that real-time reporting of overflows is impossible, especially if they happen outside of
office  hours,  due  to  the  lack  of  staff  (Lahti,  2014).  Efficient  communication  requires  sufficient
resources.
Cooperation increased towards the end of the study period. Finding a common goal was
of crucial importance to this process. Nevertheless, to make cooperation function properly, the
problems described in this chapter should be considered. It is difficult to see efficient cooperation
between stakeholders who are convinced that they have significantly opposing values. Similarly, it is
evident that cooperation requires efficient communication.
Evolution from juxtaposition to cooperation
The problem at the beginning of the study period was discovered and named and a scientific practice
established for monitoring. There was some argumentation related to the basis of the problem,
because there was no scientific consensus for the effect of overflows. Nevertheless, the debate was
mainly about legitimizing the overflows as an environmental  problem that needs to be solved and
about possible solutions.
The debate was polarized (see Fig. 3). The critical group legitimized their claim that the
overflows must be ended, resting their arguments on the ecological and recreational values of the
river and on the moral responsibility that we have for our environment. The BAU group tried to make
the problem unpolitical, arguing strongly that it was impossible to stop the overflows completely, due
to the aforementioned technical and financial problems. The groups had different perceptions of the
problem: its causes, communication, and to some extent its solution.
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Figure 3. Summary of the stakeholders’ divided viewpoints.
The turning point in the debate was reached in 2013, when the waterworks announced
that their long-term goal was to terminate wastewater overflows (HSY & VHVSY, 2013; HU
6.2.2013; HS 28.4.2013). At the same time, the waterworks and officials held the first cooperative
meeting with the NGOs. Our material doesn’t provide unambiguous explanation for this rather
thorough change in target-setting. Increased public attention and pressure combined with the
tendency of tightening statutory demands to decrease discharges is a possible explanation. However,
since few suggestions of concrete measures to achieve this target have been presented, it could also
be seen as a strategic and rhetoric concession to curb the critique from the public. Increased
willingness for cooperation together with a surprising and sudden shift in target-setting could suggest
that the change was triggered by a combination of these factors. In any case, after this point the
wastewater overflows were commonly accepted as an environmental problem that should be solved.
The focus then moved to ways of solving the problem.
Cooperation has continued. The second official meeting in 2014 was much more
cooperative than the first one in 2013. There were signs of a possible meeting halfway: Virho declared
in  the  spring  of  2015  that  it  was  necessary  to  secure  the  functioning  of  the  sewage  system  in  as
favorable a state as possible during floods (Stenholm, 2015). The claim is not as peremptory as it
used to be. The construction process has clearly reached the step in which action is invoked and the
central forum of debate turns from mass media into politics (Hannigan, 2006). The problem is now
in a state in which it could be solved.
Nevertheless, there is still a lack of concrete plans for solving the problem. Some
concrete changes and accounts have been made (e.g. HSY, 2014), but nobody believes that these
could totally stop the overflows. Now that a common ambition has been declared, there is a risk that
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the conflict will again be ignited if the parties lack a common view of how the reforms will be brought
about. One problem will most probably be the cost of the solution and another the timetable. The
parties may not have the same idea of the length of time needed to perform certain renovations or
changes. Are a few years sufficient or not to accomplish infrastructural improvements? The relative
perception of the duration of change varies according to the different users. Several years of hampered
recreational use is a long time, while infrastructural constructions ordinarily require very long time
periods. When the City of Helsinki finally decided that all wastewater should be treated, it required
43 years to complete the decision (Laakkonen, 2001). Possible misunderstandings related to these
issues could have been avoided through open conversation about the targets and ways to reach them.
Strengthening cooperation can prevent conflicts
Networking, opening of new policy windows, and developing technical expertise are key elements
of success in the contesting phase (Hannigan, 2006). Proper cooperation could lead to win-win
situations in the case of the Vantaa River. Another pollution case in Helsinki shows that downplaying
lay experience and knowledge in matters of local environment increases confrontation and mistrust
(Saikkonen, 2015). In Finland, the method of governance has been described as being more closed
than open, which means that traditionally the citizens have not been seen as active subjects (Laine &
Peltonen, 2003). Alternatively, NGOs have the potential to democratize expertise and make
knowledge useful (Eden et al., 2006). It could be beneficial to strengthen stakeholder participation in
the overflow case.
One aspect that should be considered is the role played by NGOs and private persons
as producers of environmental knowledge. There is evidence to suggest that citizens would be capable
of participating more than is commonly believed (e.g. Fischer, 2003). Virho especially has several
times  emphasized  their  thorough  knowledge  of  the  river,  its  fish  populations,  and  the  effects  of
wastewater overflows. It could be worth trying to encourage them to participate actively in the
monitoring process of the river. Information from citizens’ cloud services were also taken into
account when the renovations of the sewer systems were completed.
While the wastewater infrastructure as a whole and its prospective improvements are
the responsibility of the public utilities, the various stakeholders need to be incorporated into the
process. The annual cooperation meetings have proved to be a good start. Still, it is important to
ensure that the cooperation will not exist only in reports and official comments. In cooperation, all
the participants should feel that they can, at least to some extent, influence the situation. Also, it
seems that because of the background process kind of operation, currently the public is not well
informed when it comes to the normalized practices, technical limitations and legislation. More open
dialogue could reduce misunderstandings and excessive expectations.
New, up-to-date, and interactive communication channels could be developed through
cooperation. NGOs have valuable experience in a number of areas from fostering new communication
channels, e.g. social media such as the Facebook page “Save the Vantaa River” (Pelastakaa
Vantaanjoki), to effective and extensive information flow with broad coverage. The new methods of
information sharing could also be used to announce the overflows outside office hours. If the activists
were able to participate in the meetings of WWTPs and city governments where the concrete
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decisions and plans for solving the problems are initiated, they could inform other interested persons
about the progress made. This would make the process more transparent and reduce the mistrust on
both sides. It would also make it easier to obtain publicity of the slow progress made in solving the
problem, since it is not newsworthy enough in the traditional media and therefore not highlighted.
Setting interim targets would help to concretize the path towards the solution.
Open communication  also  helps  stakeholders  to  form a  mutual  understanding  of  the
situation. To make cooperation work, it is important that everyone has a shared view on what is going
to be done, why, and with which timetable. If the stakeholders have different expectations, the
probability of disappointment, frustration, and conflict increases. Without concrete and realistic
plans, it may also seem that the announcement of the target of ending the overflows is mainly a way
to calm down the critic, not find a real solution.
CONCLUSION
The case of the Vantaa River shows that an existing wastewater treatment infrastructure is not a final
and completed solution working in isolation of society. Even as a societally rather invisible, low-
interest background process, it requires constant developing, technological improvements, and
cooperation with several interest groups. The conflict about the wastewater overflows in the region
of the Vantaa River is an exemplary case of the phenomenon of previously normalized, established
conventions becoming the objects of politicized (environmental) problems.
The overflow problem must be seen as part of the continuum of the river water-quality
improvement during the last three decades. Improved environmental quality has promoted more
extensive recreational use and substantial investments in river restoration, especially in fish stocks.
Summer floods followed by large wastewater overflows in 2004 were discharged into an important
local recreational haven, instead of the open sewer-like river of the 1960s. Currently, the wastewater
overflows to the Vantaa River are seen as a threat to other uses and values of the river. Hence, they
spark debate about the legitimacy of the overflows as a part of the wastewater treatment system.
The evolution of politicized environmental problems is influenced by many
simultaneously evolving aspects and societal developments, which underlines the complex, context-
bound and temporally fluctuating nature of disputes like our case. Available technological solutions
and the related costs necessitate reoccurring economic prioritizations that in turn reflect the valuation
of different services at a given time. Within the prevalent contextual frame of increasing living
standards, existing comprehensive sanitary infrastructure and the general tendency of tightening
statutory demands towards wastewater treatment, the politicization of the overflow problematic
increases attention towards curbing them more vigorously.
Increased public awareness about and engagement in the environmental vulnerabilities
of sanitary infrastructure, triggered by imposing, yet occasional and short-lived overflow episodes,
enhanced through media publicity and new, instant communication channels, generate a new kind of
pressure for wastewater authorities to publicly encounter the previously rather low-attention problem.
However, a more detailed analysis of the impetuses for change in the goal setting of the wastewater
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authorities towards overflows would require e.g. in-depth interviews of the key stakeholders, and
remains a task of future research.
Involvement in coordinated public discussion about the overflows seems to strengthen
and accelerate the shift towards solution-oriented cooperation. Hence, the case underlines the benefits
of an inclusive communication strategy at an early stage of the process. In our case, the interest groups
in this case have continued cooperative meetings after the study period and the results are considered
promising (Lahti, 2015). While some questions still await resolution, progress towards a mutually
satisfactory direction within a realistic timeframe seems now possible. With the establishment of
mutually acceptable guidelines for future developments, the politicized phase of an environmental
problem shifts into a more de-politicized stage, at least for the time being.
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